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Abstract Many entrepreneurs commercialize an idea
they initially developed as employees of an incumbent
firm. While some face retaliatory reactions from their
(former) employer, others are left alone or even support-
ed. It is not clear, however, why some employee spin-
offs face parental hostility while others do not, and to
what extent this parental hostility affects employee spin-
offs’ performance. Integrating the resource-based view
with insights on competition and retaliation, we propose
that parental hostility increases with the (perceived)
competitive threat posed by an employee spin-off. Spe-
cifically, we advance employee spin-offs’ initial strate-
gic actions (offering substitute products, hiring em-
ployees of the parent, and attempting to first develop
the idea inside the parent) as key drivers of parental
hostility and consequent spin-off performance. Results
from a pooled dataset of 1083 employee spin-offs in
Germany confirm that these initial strategic actions trig-
ger parental hostility, which in turn, and contrary to
expectations, positively affects employee spin-offs’ in-
novation and economic performance. These results ad-
vance the literature on employee spin-offs in several
ways and have important practical implications.
Keywords Employee spin-offs . Product
substitutability . Employee poaching . Intrapreneurial
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1 Introduction
Employee spin-offs, whose founders commercialize
ideas they initially developed as employees of an in-
cumbent company (Fryges et al. 2014), have increas-
ingly attracted academics’ and policy makers’ enthusi-
asm. By capitalizing on technical, managerial, regulato-
ry, and industry-specific resources from their previous
employers (Chatterji 2009), employee spin-offs can be-
come exceptional performers that outpace other new
entrants (e.g., Agarwal and Shah 2014; Fackler et al.
2016). As such, they can accelerate knowledge transfer,
innovation, competitiveness, and employment growth
in the economy (Hellmann 2007; Klepper 2015;
Moncada et al. 1999). However, whether the “parents”,
or organizations from which these new ventures are
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formed, are equally enthusiastic about these spin-off
activities, remains to be seen.
Contrary to corporate spin-offs, i.e., new ventures
that are initiated and partially owned by the parent firm
(Iturriaga and Cruz 2008), many employee spin-offs
have no formal relationship with their parent organiza-
tion. Although the popular (e.g., TechChrunch) and
academic literature (e.g., Dahlstrand 1997; Fryges and
Wright 2014; Garvin 1983; Somaya et al. 2008) feature
several stories of employee spin-offs that are tolerated or
even supported by their parent, we know that many
parent organizations are in fact hostile towards the es-
tablishment of employee spin-offs (Klepper and Sleeper
2005; McKendrick et al. 2009; Walter et al. 2014). They
regard them as “parasites” (Klepper 2001, on Fairchild)
or “mafia” (Garrett et al. 2017, on PayPal) who steal
their resources and ideas, and invoke non-compete
clauses and intellectual property lawsuits to hinder their
establishment (Thompson and Chen 2011).
While the study by Walter and his colleagues (2014)
was among the first to investigate the effects of parental
hostility—a parent’s disapproval of the spawning of a
spin-off within it ranks—on employee spin-offs’ time to
breakeven, and offer counter-strategies mitigating these
negative effects, it did not explain why these hostile
reactions occur in the first place. Given the vital role
employee spin-offs play in our economy (Klepper
2015), it is important to fully understand the forces
driving parental hostility towards their founding, and
the implications for employee spin-offs’ subsequent
performance.
Combining a resource-based perspective with in-
sights from the literature on competition and
retaliation—a stream analyzing incumbents’ defense
strategies towards new market entrants—this study pro-
poses that parental hostility increases with the
(perceived) competitive threat posed by an employee
spin-off. In particular, we argue that an employee spin-
off’s strategic actions at the time of foundation, such as
(1) offering substitute products (i.e., goods or services
that perform a similar function, see Porter 1980), (2)
hiring employees of the parent, and (3) attempting to
first implement the business idea inside the parent, will
increase the (perceived) competitive threat it poses to its
parent and will thereby trigger parental hostility towards
its foundation. Furthermore, we argue that this parental
hostility will in turn negatively affect the employee spin-
off’s subsequent innovation and economic performance.
We argue that a spin-off that commercializes goods or
services which are substitutes to its parent’s offering and
that hires employees of its parent, expropriates a greater
share of the parent’s tangible and intangible resources
(Franco and Filson 2006; Klepper and Sleeper 2005;
Rocha et al. 2018). This reduces the parent’s competi-
tive advantage and increases the likelihood the employ-
ee spin-off will become a direct competitor (Campbell
et al. 2012; Colombo et al. 2017; Kim and Steensma
2017; Klepper 2015; Phillips 2002; Wezel et al. 2006).
At the same time, the fact that an employee spin-off first
tried to implement its idea inside the parent, but did not
reach an agreement towards idea implementation (e.g.,
Anton and Yao 1995; Klepper and Thompson 2010),
may increase the likelihood the parent perceives it as a
competitive threat. We argue that this increased per-
ceived competitive threat will trigger more hostile pa-
rental reactions towards the spin-off’s foundation (Chen
et al. 2007; Fan 2010), which will impair the employee
spin-off’s access to its parent’s technological and com-
plementary resources and thereby negatively affects its
subsequent performance (e.g., Parhankangas and
Arenius 2003).
Our analysis employs a pooled dataset from the
KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel survey, conducted in Ger-
many during 2008–2014, which includes over 6000
newly founded firms from all industries. These data
allow us to distinguish employee spin-offs from
other start-ups, construct measures for parental hos-
tility and employee spin-offs’ initial strategic ac-
tions, and control for parent, spin-off, and founder
characteristics. We empirically distinguish between
spin-offs’ innovation and economic performance to
investigate the generalizability of the results (as in
Cainelli et al. 2006). Using a pooled dataset of 3082
observations on 1083 employee spin-offs, we find
that an employee spin-off’s strategy at the time of its
foundation—in particular its initial decision to com-
mercialize substitute products, hire employees from
the parent, and first try to develop the idea inside the
parent organization—condition parental hostility to-
wards the spin-off’s foundation, but that, contrary to
expectations, this hostility in turn positively affects
employee spin-offs’ innovation and economic
performance.
By highlighting the importance of the employee spin-
off’s initial strategy and by explicitly investigating the
parent–spin-off relationship from a resource-based and
competition and retaliation perspectives, we advance the
literature on employee spin-offs in several ways. First,
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we investigate spin-offs’ initial business strategy as a
trigger of the retaliatory actions taken by the parent
organizations. As such, we expand the seminal work
by Walter et al. (2014) by showing that the links be-
tween parental hostility, employee spin-off’s strategy
and employee spin-off’s performance are in fact more
complex than previously presumed, with initial strategic
actions triggering parental hostility in the first place.
Second, we are the first to report a positive relationship
between parental hostility towards employee spin-off
foundation and subsequent spin-off performance.
Through additional analyses, we rule out the possibility
that this result is driven by a survivorship bias, with only
the best performing spin-offs surviving in the face of
parental hostility. In trying to explain the robust positive
effect of parental hostility on employee spin-off perfor-
mance, we advance the relevance of autonomy and
competence building as a potential mediator in this
relationship (e.g., Chesbrough 2003; Cirillo et al.
2014; McGrath 2001). We argue that autonomy and
competence building are crucial for employee spin-offs
in developing a more aggressive market entry strategy,
which increases their chances of successfully competing
against the parent, and of surviving and performing well
(e.g., Andrevski and Ferrier 2019). Also, we suggest
that retaliatory parental reactions against a spin-off’s
establishment, contrary to expectations, endorse a spin-
off’s reputation, which may help to attract outside in-
vestors and customers. The fact that we contradict pre-
vious evidence points to the need for replication studies
(Ethiraj et al. 2016) and to potential moderating factors
that need to be taken into account in these replication
efforts. Our results have important implications for em-
ployee spin-offs trying to optimize their initial business
strategy, as well as for their parent organizations.
The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows: first,
we provide a theoretical background and develop the
main hypotheses. Second, we introduce data and
methods. Third, we present the empirical results, and
finally, we discuss the contribution of our work and
provide suggestions for further research.
2 Theoretical background
2.1 Characteristics of employee spin-offs
Employee spin-offs have been defined as start-ups
founded by a former employee, of which the
establishment relies on “critical know-how acquired
during his previous professional experience in order to
exploit an unused potential” (Moncada et al. 1999, p.
IV). Authors have concretized this definition of employ-
ee spin-offs by applying different criteria, including that
the venture has to operate in the same industry (e.g.,
Klepper 2015; Thompson and Chen 2011) or employ a
particular share of employees from the previous compa-
ny (e.g., Eriksson and Kuhn 2006; Muendler et al.
2012). However, as argued by Fryges et al. (2014),
hiring employees of the incumbent company or estab-
lishing a business in the same industry does not neces-
sarily imply a transfer of critical know-how. At the same
time, the transfer of knowledge does not necessarily
require the transfer of employees, because tacit knowl-
edge resides not only in a team or routines, but also in
individuals, i.e., founders (Grant 1996). Fryges et al.
(2014) and Moncada et al. (1999) therefore define an
employee spin-off as an entrepreneurial new venture
founded by a former employee of an incumbent compa-
ny, and where a new idea (i.e., a unique product, tech-
nology, production process, or management concept),
which the founder developed during her work in this
private company, was essential for setting up the new
business.
According to the resource-based view (Barney
1991), an organization’s success is dependent on its
possession of valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-
substitutable resources, among which knowledge fig-
ures prominently (Dierickx and Cool 1989). In this
view, the knowledge and resources that are transferred
from a parent to its employee spin-off can become the
spin-off ’s key source of competitive advantage
(Agarwal et al. 2004, 2016). On the one hand, this
transfer can take place while the founder is still
employed at the parent as she acquires skills and idio-
syncratic knowledge about technologies (e.g., products,
technologies, processes) and markets (e.g., customer
demands, distribution channels, market specifications),
gains access to industry-specific social and financial
networks, and discovers potential market entry oppor-
tunities (e.g., Chatterji 2009; Cooper 1985; Dahl and
Sorenson 2014; Franco and Filson 2006; Ganco 2013;
Gompers et al. 2005; Klepper 2001; Klepper and
Sleeper 2005). These endowments at birth are known
to have long-term effects for spin-offs’ development and
performance (Agarwal et al. 2004; Ganco and Agarwal
2009; Klepper 2015). On the other hand, this transfer
can take place also after the spin-off’s foundation, when
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the spin-off can, for example, exploit parents’ customer
and supplier networks (Gjerløv-Juel and Dahl 2012;
Phillips 2002; Hallen 2008), or benefit from parents’
technological, managerial and financial support (e.g.,
Moncada et al. 1999; Parhankangas and Arenius 2003;
Semadeni and Cannella 2011; Tübke 2004; Zahra and
George 1999). However, the extent to which employee
spin-offs can access and exploit these resources depends
on their parents’ goodwill (e.g., Furlan and Grandinetti
2016; Garvin 1983; Hellmann 2007; Parhankangas and
Arenius 2003; Semadeni and Cannella 2011), and not all
parent organizations are equally supportive. In fact, the
founding of an employee spin-off often elicits hostile
reactions by the parent firm (Walter et al. 2014).
Integrating a resource-based perspective with in-
sights from the literature on competition and retaliation,
the next section proposes that the initial strategic actions
of an employee spin-off can increase the (perceived)
competitive threat it poses to its parent and thereby
trigger parental hostility.
2.2 (Perceived) competitive threat and parental hostility
According to the literature on competition and retalia-
tion (e.g., Chen andMiller 1994; Chen 1996; Chen et al.
2007; Fan 2010; Kuester et al. 1999; Gatignon et al.
1997), an incumbent who faces a new entrant (e.g., an
employee spin-off) can defend itself by applying retal-
iation—“a counterattack to a competitive move”
(Kuester et al. 1999, p. 91). It may enforce non-
compete clauses (Thompson and Chen 2011), threaten
with lawsuits about intellectual property infringement
(Klepper and Sleeper 2005), signal readiness to retaliate
(e.g., by building a reputation for toughness in patent
enforcement) (Agarwal et al. 2009), enhance advertis-
ing, salesforce, or channel expenditures (Gatignon et al.
1997), reduce prices and/or compete on costs (Kuester
et al. 1999), or even propagate negative information
about the new entrant, in this case the employee spin-
off (Walter et al. 2014). According to Porter (1980), an
incumbent will retaliate if the new entrant poses a
(perceived) competitive threat to its economic and
non-economic performance (e.g., endangering its sales
growth or reputation). We argue that certain strategic
actions of employee spin-offs at founding such as (1) the
commercialization of substitute goods or services, (2)
employee poaching, i.e., hiring employees of the parent,
and (3) intrapreneurial attempts to first implement the
business idea inside the parent company, increase the
(perceived) competitive threat the spin-off poses to its
parent, and therefore the likelihood of a hostile parental
reaction.
First of all, we argue that an employee spin-off’s
initial product strategy acts as one of the key factors
triggering parental hostility towards its foundation.
When entering the market, employee spin-offs can de-
cide on producing substitutes to the parents’ offering
(i.e., products which the consumer perceives as similar),
complementary or vertically related products, or pro-
ceed with a completely novel idea (e.g., Fan and Lang
2000). From a resource-based perspective, we can argue
that spin-offs producing substitute goods or services to
their parents’ offering expropriate a higher share of their
parents’ firm-specific knowledge than employee spin-
offs with complementary or unrelated product offerings,
and therefore pose a more important (perceived) com-
petitive threat (Klepper and Sleeper 2005). Tacit knowl-
edge (on technologies or complementary activities),
which resides within and across individuals (Grant
1996), is generally difficult to imitate by outside firms
(Kogut and Zander 1992), and therefore embodies a
sustainable competitive advantage (Coff 1997;
Spender 1996; Wright et al. 2018). However, this com-
petitive advantage may be impaired if an imitator is born
fromwithin a firm.While an employee spin-off entering
the market with a complement to the parent’s offering
also leverages its parent’s resources for its own benefit,
this entry nevertheless is not as threatening as the one by
a substitute product (Colombo et al. 2017). In particular,
it has been noted that employee spin-offs that commer-
cialize substitute goods or services replicate and transfer
a greater share of parents’ tacit knowledge than spin-offs
commercializing products that are complementary or
completely unrelated to those of the parent firm, thereby
reducing parents’ competitive advantage to a larger
extent (Agarwal et al. 2016; Campbell et al. 2012;
Garrett et al. 2017). Based on competition and retalia-
tion literature, we can also argue that the more similar a
spin-off’s substitute product is to its parent’s offering,
the more direct competition it will represent, and the
more hostile reactions it will trigger (e.g., Chen and
Miller 1994; Chen et al. 2007). As explained by Klepper
and Sleeper (2005), an employee spin-off producing
substitute products becomes a direct competitor, a pred-
ator stealing its parent’s ideas and innovations, and
hence poses a higher threat and competitive pressure
to tha t pa ren t than a sp in -o f f deve lop ing
complementary or unrelated products (Gatignon et al.
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1997; Kuester et al. 1999; Phillips 2002; Wezel et al.
2006). In particular, one can expect that a parent facing a
spin-off with a substitute (versus complementary or
dissimilar) product strategy is more heavily affected,
especially if its sales depend on that specific offering
(Robertson et al. 1995), and will therefore react more
negatively (Thompson and Chen 2011). For instance, an
incumbent may incur negative economic consequences
from a new entrant with a substitute product strategy as
the latter may slow the incumbent’s sales growth, dis-
turb the current pricing strategy, or reduce its capacity
utilization (Porter 1980). This is also consistent with the
hotelling model, stating that the lower the distance be-
tween an established company—in this case the
parent—and the new entrant—in this case the employee
spin-off—the higher the competition (Belleflame and
Peitz 2010). Therefore, bringing these arguments to-
gether, we propose that:
Hypothesis 1: Product substitutability has a posi-
tive effect on parental hostility.
A second mechanism that may increase the
(perceived) competitive threat an employee spin-off
poses to its parent, and therefore may trigger parental
hostility, is employee poaching, i.e., the hiring of em-
ployees of the parent firm. Employees are often
regarded as the “repositories of skills, routines, and
knowledge that they carry with them from their prior
employer to their new employer” (Corredoira and
Rosenkopf 2010, p. 159). Together with valuable hu-
man capital, mobile employees also convey relational
capital residing in teams, such as shared values, ties, and
knowledge, which jointly depict an excellent opportu-
nity for knowledge transfer and unique resources that
are difficult to imitate (Rocha et al. 2018). When hiring
employees of the parent, employee spin-offs can capi-
talize on these employees’ (a) technological and com-
plementary knowledge, allowing the spin-offs to imple-
ment more complex business ideas (Ganco 2013), (b)
colleague-specific human capital, which reduces coor-
dination costs (Campbell et al. 2014), and (c) shared
understanding, which accelerates product commerciali-
zation process (Beckman 2006); all in turn positively
translating into performance outcomes (e.g., Klepper
2001; Phillips 2002; Somaya et al. 2008; Rocha et al.
2018). When a spin-off hires employees from its parent,
that parent firm’s competitive advantage is reduced, as it
loses not only the tacit knowledge embedded in each
employee, but also the concomitant resources such as
personal relationships with customers, suppliers, and
complementors (Agarwal et al. 2016; Corredoira and
Rosenkopf 2010; Wezel et al. 2006). This loss in turn
disturbs a parent’s organizational routines (e.g., hiring
and training new employees) and decreases its viability
(e.g., taking away key customers) (Colombo et al. 2017;
Gjerløv-Juel and Dahl 2012; Klepper 2007, 2009;
McKendrick et al. 2009; Phillips 2002). Moreover, the
more employees of its parent a spin-off hires, the more
technological and complementary knowledge and re-
sources it can incorporate, and the greater the competi-
tive threat it poses to the parent (Agarwal et al. 2016;
Campbell et al. 2014;Wezel et al. 2006). It is known that
employees who move to a spin-off are often more mo-
tivated to transfer, and respectively to more authentical-
ly replicate, knowledge gained at the parent firm to the
new spin-off than employees that move to an established
firm, which is already endowed with a set of routines
(Campbell et al. 2012; Wezel et al. 2006). In order to
protect themselves from employee mobility and the
competitive pressure it induces, parent firms may take
retaliatory actions against the spin-off’s foundation
(Agarwal et al. 2009). We therefore propose that:
Hypothesis 2: Employee poaching has a positive
effect on parental hostility.
A final and more subtle reason fueling parental hos-
tility may relate to the spin-off’s formation, and in
particular, the founder’s intrapreneurial attempts to first
develop the idea inside the parent organization. Anec-
dotal evidence suggests that founders first offer their
business ideas to their parent organizations and found
an independent spin-off only after being rejected by
them (Hellmann 2007; Klepper 2009). This happens
when the parent and the spin-off’s founder cannot reach
an ex-ante or ex-post contract agreement upon the em-
ployee’s remuneration for offering the idea (Anton and
Yao 1995) or when other kinds of disagreements with
respect to idea implementation arise (e.g., dispute over
intellectual property rights or personal tensions)
(Klepper and Sleeper 2005; Klepper and Thompson
2010; Thompson and Chen 2011). However, this dis-
agreement about the idea implementation, and the con-
sequent formation of an employee spin-off may be
perceived as a potential competitive threat to the parent
organization, and thus evoke its hostility. First of all,
disagreements and personal conflicts about the
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implementation of the idea inside the parent may carry
over to the spin-off process. Second, after an employee’s
unsuccessful attempt to implement the business idea
internally, the parent may also become more aware of
the technologies and complementary assets used, and
thus may demand ownership and control of the intellec-
tual property developed inside its organization. Finally,
revelation of the idea may provide the parent with an
opportunity to react (Chen et al. 2007). Even if a parent
was initially not interested in the business idea, either
because of bureaucratic inertia or excessive focus on the
demands of existing customers (i.e., unwillingness to
cannibalize its own market) (Christensen and
Rosenbloom 1995; Gompers et al. 2005; Hellmann
2007; Robertson et al. 1995), employees’ efforts to
implement the idea may act as an awakening signal.
Overall, intrapreneurial attempts to implement the busi-
ness idea inside the parent firm may make that parent
more aware of the competitive threat a spin-off could
pose, and may therefore elicit hostile reactions to the
spin-off’s establishment. Or in other words:
Hypothesis 3: Intrapreneurial attempts to first im-
plement the business idea in the parent company
have a positive effect on parental hostility.
2.3 The effect of parental hostility on performance
After proposing that parental hostility is affected by a
spin-off’s initial strategy, we aim to understand its effect
on a spin-off’s subsequent performance. Access to par-
ents’ technological know-how and complementary as-
sets has been shown to be extremely beneficial for
employee spin-offs (e.g., Agarwal and Shah 2014;
Campbell et al. 2012; Klepper 2015). For example,
spin-offs’ that have access to parents’ technological
know-how (Teece 1986) are better equipped to meet
(emerging) market needs (Chr is tensen and
Rosenbloom 1995) and are more likely to introduce
innovations themselves (Agarwal and Shah 2014;
Spulber 2012; Sullivan and Marvel 2011). At the same
time, access to parents’ complementary resources
(Teece 1986) such as social capital, marketing capabil-
ities, distribution networks, or manufacturing has posi-
tive performance implications (e.g., Franco and Filson
2006; Hill et al. 2009; Dahlstrand 1997; Parhankangas
and Arenius 2003). For example, access to the parent’s
industry-specific social capital allows an employee spin-
off to build a reputation and a network of relationships
(Chatterji 2009; Dahl and Sorenson 2014; Kor et al.
2007), essential for leveraging resources, developing
innovations, and achieving fruitful performance out-
comes such as sales (Elfring and Hulsink 2007; Furlan
and Grandinetti 2016; Somaya et al. 2008; Sullivan and
Marvel 2011).
However, access to parents’ technological and com-
plementary resources—especially after spin-off
foundation—will depend heavily on the goodwill of
the parent, i.e., on whether the parent is willing to
collaborate with the spin-off, for example by providing
or buying complementary materials (Agarwal and Shah
2014; Dahlstrand 1997; Furlan and Grandinetti 2016;
Garvin 1983; Kim and Steensma 2017). Whereas cor-
porate spin-offs whose parents are supportive or neutral
towards their establishment will most likely have an
easy access to their parents’ resources and networks,
employee spin-offs with hostile parents will have no or
restricted access to these resources. As Walter et al.
(2014) explain, hostile parents will undermine spin-offs’
activities directly by refusing access to parental re-
sources and support. Patent litigation, for example, can
be extremely harmful for newly established spin-off due
to its high costs and delay of the product development.
A hostile parent can also damage a spin-off in an indirect
way, for instance by convincing its partners not to
collaborate with the spin-off or by spreading damaging
information about it, and this can overshadow other
useful signaling mechanisms (Walter et al. 2014). In
fact, under parental hostility, spin-off founders are
forced to decouple their networks from the parent com-
pany in order to lessen this potential negative influence,
and rather focus on developing networks outside the
parent firm’s control (Furlan and Grandinetti 2016).
Therefore, building on the resource-based view, it can
be argued that parental hostility towards its foundation
reduces an employee spin-off’s access to technological
and complementary resources inside and outside the
parent firm, and this in turn undermines subsequent
employee spin-off performance.
Notwithstanding the general belief that employee
spin-offs can benefit substantially from access to their
parents’ resources, some authors have argued that in
order for spin-offs to grow and succeed in changing
environments, they need to extend and adapt the
resource-base and routines they inherit from their par-
ents (e.g., Chesbrough 2003; Helfat and Lieberman
2002; Klepper 2001). While this organizational heritage
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at first sight appears to be opportune, it may push spin-
off founders into a trap of inertia and resistance to
change (Agarwal et al. 2004; Helfat and Lieberman
2002; Ferriani et al. 2012). For example, the spin-off
may not sense the need to pursue new customers or
applications, and this can become a barrier to learning
from other partners beyond their existing network
(Elfring and Hulsink 2007; Parhankangas and Arenius
2003). At the same time, continuous reliance on internal
parents’ practices and heavy use of their resources may
not only diminish spin-offs’ growth prospects and mar-
ket value, but also impair their ability to experiment and
adapt (Chesbrough 2003; Semadeni and Cannella
2011). We can expect, however, that this risk of inertia
will prevail far less when spin-offs are confronted with
hostile parental reactions, as hostility will not only en-
able but also force spin-offs to develop novel capabili-
ties. The resulting flexibility and access to new networks
is expected to lead to a more aggressive competition
strategy, which in turn can contribute to a more success-
ful market entry (e.g., Agarwal et al. 2004; Andrevski
and Ferrier 2019). More precisely, as “firms with similar
resource profiles are likely to have comparable capabil-
ities and competitive stances” (Chen et al. 2007, p. 106),
only by developing new capabilities employee spin-offs
can reduce the effectiveness of their parents’ retaliation
and fare better in competing against them (Chen 1996;
Kuester et al. 1999). Without these efforts employee
spin-offs, who oftentimes have limited financial re-
sources, could not afford direct competition with their
large incumbents and be deemed to failure (Fan 2010).
Moreover, parents’ retaliatory actions towards employ-
ee spin-offs’ establishment may in fact send a positive
signal to the market that the spin-off is valuable. Com-
petition and retaliation literature suggests that incum-
bent firms are more likely to retaliate if they “feel that
something important is at stake” (Chen andMiller 1994,
p. 86), and the decision to retaliate may therefore be
perceived as an indication of the spin-off’s potential and
increase the interest of customers and outside investors
(see Thiel andMasters 2014). Finally, it could be argued
that parents’ retaliatory actions may introduce a survi-
vorship bias, in the sense that only the best employee
spin-offs will survive in the face of such parental
hostility.
Although some arguments hence suggest that paren-
tal hostility may be less detrimental for employee spin-
off performance than generally assumed, the limited
empirical evidence suggests that the negative effect of
parental hostility is prevailing. The findings fromWalter
et al.’s (2014) analysis of 144 technology-based spin-
offs demonstrate that almost half of the spin-offs were
confronted with parental hostility, and that this hostility
substantially prolonged their time to breakeven. There-
fore, we propose that:
Hypothesis 4: Parental hostility has a negative
effect on employee spin-off performance.
As a consequence of integrating the logic behind
Hypothesis 1–3 and Hypothesis 4, an indirect effect of
employee spin-offs’ strategic actions at founding via
parental hostility on subsequent employee spin-off per-
formance is expected. More specifically, we argued that
a spin-off’s decision to commercialize substitute prod-
ucts for its parent’s offering, the fact that it hires its
parent’s employees, and attempts to first implement
the idea inside the parent firm, will cause the parent to
see its spin-off as a competitive threat. By offering
substitute goods or services and by hiring employees
of its parent, a spin-off can capitalize on a greater share
of the parent’s tangible and intangible resources, which
reduces the parent’s competitive advantage and there-
fore increases the likelihood the employee spin-off will
be considered a direct competitor (e.g., Agarwal et al.
2016; Colombo et al. 2017; Phillips 2002; Wezel et al.
2006). At the same time, the fact that an employee spin-
off first tries to implement its idea inside the parent, but
does not reach an agreement towards idea implementa-
tion (e.g., Anton and Yao 1995; Klepper and Thompson
2010), may increase the likelihood the parent “spots” the
spin-off and identifies it as a competitive threat. Because
this perception of the new entrant (i.e., the spin-off) as a
competitive threat is known to trigger retaliatory actions
from the incumbent (i.e., the parent) (Chen et al. 2007;
Fan 2010; Porter 1980), a spin-off’s decision to com-
mercialize similar products as the parent, the hiring of its
parent’s employees, and attempts to first implement the
idea inside the parent firm can be expected to trigger
parental hostility. This parental hostility, in turn, is as-
sumed to hinder spin-off performance. This is because
parental hostility will restrict an employee spin-off’s
access to its parent’s technological know-how and com-
plementary assets, which are supposedly crucial for the
spin-off’s performance in terms of survival, innovation,
and growth (e.g., Andersson and Klepper 2013; Fackler
et al. 2016; Fryges et al. 2014). Hence, summarizing the
hypothesized relationships between employee spin-offs’
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initial strategic actions and parental hostility, as well as
between parental hostility and spin-offs’ performance,
an indirect effect of initial strategic actions on spin-offs’
performance is expected that is mediated via parental
hostility. Therefore, it is posited that:
Hypothesis 5: There is an indirect negative effect of
product substitutability on employee spin-off per-
formance through parental hostility.
Hypothesis 6: There is an indirect negative effect of
employee poaching on employee spin-off perfor-
mance through parental hostility.
Hypothesis 7: There is an indirect negative effect of
entrepreneurial attempts to implement the idea in-
side the parent on employee spin-off performance
through parental hostility.
3 Methods
3.1 Sample
For the empirical hypotheses testing, we use data from
the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel survey established in
2008 by the Centre for European Economic Research
(ZEW) in a collaboration with KfW Bankengruppe (the
state-owned promotional bank in Germany) and
Creditreform (the credit rating agency in Germany).1
The sample of this telephone survey is randomly select-
ed from theMannheim Enterprise Panel, which contains
information on all economically active firms in Germa-
ny and is representative of the country’s corporate land-
scape (Bersch et al. 2014). The start-up sample includes
only legally independent firms (subsidiaries and
mergers are excluded) and is stratified based on sector
and year of foundation (firms have to be 3 years old or
younger prior to the survey year). Each year, the start-
ups from the previous waves are surveyed again until
they reach an age of 8 years, while new ventures are
added to the sample (for more details see Fryges et al.
2010). This results in a total sample of about 6000 start-
ups per year (representing a response rate of approxi-
mately 20% for the first time interviews and approxi-
mately 56% for the follow-up interviews). In any given
survey year t, start-ups are typically questioned about
their foundation (unless this information is available
from previous survey waves) and about their activities
in the reference period t-1. An essential feature of the
KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel survey is that all interviews
are conducted with start-up founders or co-founders
under the terms of confidentiality, which warrants data
quality.
In order to distinguish employee spin-offs from
other start-up companies, we apply information from
a special module on venture origin which was includ-
ed in the 2010 survey wave only. Overall, 6236 full
interviews were conducted in this survey wave. How-
ever, start-ups participating for the first time were not
surveyed about their origin, which limits the sample to
4106 firms. Our first condition to regard a venture as
an employee spin-off is whether the founder has pre-
viously worked in a private company, which is the
case for 3504 firms. Secondly, we regard a start-up
company only as a potential employee spin-off if the
founder indicates that an idea she developed while
working at her previous employment was vital or of
major importance for establishing the venture. If the
idea was of minor or no importance at all, the start-up
is not considered an employee spin-off. This step leads
to a sample of 1455 ventures. In line with prior studies
(e.g., Fryges and Wright 2014; Helfat and Lieberman
2002), our final criterion was that the new venture had
to be initiated by the founder, and not by the parent
company itself, resulting in a sample of 1357 employ-
ee spin-offs. The share of employee spin-offs in the
total sample of 4106 start-ups approximates to 33%,
and this proportion is in line with prior findings (c.f.
Agarwal and Shah 2014). Removing observations
with missing values for the variables in our analysis,
results in a final sample of 1083 employee spin-offs
established between 2005 and 2008.
The design of the survey offers several advantages.
First, for the ventures that filled out the module on
origin in the 2010 survey, we can construct a pooled
dataset from the surveys conducted during the period
2008–2014, the reference period hence being 2007–
2013, and test the proposed effects of spin-offs’ initial
strategic actions and parental hostility on spin-off per-
formance in several subsequent years (see Agarwal
et al. 2004). In other words, a given employee spin-
off can feature multiple times in our dataset, each time
with the same values for initial strategic actions and
parental hostility towards its founding but different
1 In 2015, the survey was renamed to the IAB/ZEW Start-up Panel, as
KfW was replaced by the Research Institute of the Federal Employ-
ment Agency (IAB).
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values for control variables and performance (see de-
tailed description of variables in the next section). In
total, our pooled dataset contains 3082 observations
representing the 1083 employee spin-offs in our sam-
ple.2 Additionally, unlike prior research that investi-
gates the parent–spin-off relationship in a single in-
dustry (e.g., automobiles, bio-tech, disk drives, lasers,
semiconductors) (Klepper and Thompson 2010), the
survey enables us to generalize the results as it covers
ten different high-tech and low-tech industries and
controls for a broad set of spin-off and founder char-
acteristics. And finally, as Germany is the largest econ-
omy in Europe (Fackler et al. 2016) and the leading
player in global innovation (OECD2014), the findings
may be applicable to a global context.
3.2 Variables
Dependent variables In response to previous calls in the
literature (Miller et al. 2013;Murphy et al. 1996), we focus
on multiple spin-off performance indicators, namely on
employee spin-offs’ innovation and economic perfor-
mance (Cainelli et al. 2006; Sullivan and Marvel 2011;
Zahra and George 1999). Separate indicators of perfor-
mance may represent different constructs, and one specific
indicator can therefore not be applied as a measurement of
overall performance. For instance, start-ups may have
difficulty in both introducing firm-level and market-level
innovations and at the same time achieving high value like
sales (Sullivan and Marvel 2011). As we want to avoid
such inappropriate generalizations, we distinguish between
employee spin-offs’ innovation and economic perfor-
mance, and use multiple measurements for both.
Innovation performance is measured by two innovation
output variables, namely Firm innovation and Market
innovation, because a firm can introduce product innova-
tions (goods or services) that are new to the firm itself
(Vandenbroucke et al. 2016), but not new to the market
(OECD 2009). In line with Fryges et al. (2014), we use
survey information on whether or not the venture intro-
duced any product innovation (i.e., a new or significantly
improved good or service) in the reference year that was
new to the firm but not new to the market to construct the
binary variable Firm innovation, and on whether or not it
introduced any product innovation that was new to the
market (i.e., forwhich the spin-offwas the first to introduce
it on the regional, national, or global market) in the refer-
ence year to construct the binary variable Market innova-
tion. Like Colombo and Grilli (2005, 2010), we measure
employee spin-offs’ economic performance by looking at
the (log of the) number of Employees and Sales at each
survey reference year (adding the smallest positive value
before log-transformation). Since we control for employee
spin-offs’ age, these performance measures in fact repre-
sent the average yearly absolute employment and sales
growth in the period in which the employee spin-off is
observed (Colombo and Grilli 2010).
Independent variables Based on the KfW/ZEW ques-
tionnaire, we construct the main explanatory variables
about the parent—spin-off relationship at the time of
spin-off foundation. First, in line with Walter et al.
(2014), we constructed a binary variable of Parental
hostility. Spin-off founders were asked whether or not
the firm, in which their new idea emerged, had ham-
pered the spin-off’s foundation. If they answered posi-
tively to this question, the variable receives a value of
one, if not it receives a value of zero. About 13% of the
employee spin-offs were faced with a hostile reaction of
its parent towards spin-off foundation. Second, we cap-
ture Product substitutability by asking founders’ wheth-
er or not their initial products or services (a) were similar
to those of the parent firm, (b) improved and refined
those of the parent firm, (c) were complements to those
of the parent firm, or (d) had other relations. Respon-
dents could tick multiple options, but could also tick
none of them if their products were unrelated to those of
the parent firm. Based on these answers, we construct a
binary variable Product substitutability which receives
the value of one if the venture commercialized products
similar to the parent’s offering (option a above), and
zero otherwise.3 Like prior research, our study reveals
2 Robustness tests using only one observation per employee spin-off
confirm our results.
3 As employee spin-offs can enter the market with multiple products,
there are several cases where founders report that they produce both
substitute products and complementary products (i.e., option a is
marked along with option c). Therefore, we conducted several robust-
ness tests, namely (1) a more strict operationalization of Product
substitutability, where the variable takes the value 1 if the spin-off
commercialized similar substitute products only (i.e., ticked option a
but not option c), (2) a broader operationalisation where Product
substitutability takes the value 1 if the spin-off commercialized similar
or refined/improved products (i.e., ticked option a and/or option b,
independent of his/her response for option c and option d), and (3) an
analysis controlling for the decision to launch complementary products
only (i.e., ticked option c and not option a), where we expect opposing
effects to our main analyses. Robustness tests confirm our main results
and are available from the authors upon request.
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spin-offs’ heavy reliance on commercialization of sim-
ilar products (e.g., Hellmann 2007; Klepper and Sleeper
2005), with 68% of the employee spin-offs in our sam-
ple offering similar products as the parent organization.
Third, Employee poaching activities are captured by the
number of employees that had departed from the parent
to the spin-off. On average one third of the spin-offs in
our sample had hired employees from their parent orga-
nization, with 3 employees being recruited on average
(max 45 employees). Finally, Intrapreneurial attempts
are represented by a binary variable that is equal to one
if the founder had first attempted to implement the new
business idea inside the parent organization (which hap-
pened in 54% of the cases), and zero otherwise.
Control variables Several determinants of spin-off per-
formance are included as controls in our analyses (e.g.,
Agarwal et al. 2004, 2016; Colombo and Grilli 2005,
2010; Fryges et al. 2014; Walter et al. 2014). First, we
include venture-related controls, such as the Initial em-
ployment size representing the number of employees at
the time of spin-off foundation, the spin-off’s Age and
the main Industry it is active in. On the one hand, we
expect the industry of the spin-off to affect parental
hostility. Whereas in industries that address a stable
market demand parents typically dislike spin-off activ-
ities because they increase competition, this attitude
may differ if an industry is emerging and experiencing
rapid growth. Then “established firms might very well
encourage spin-offs” in order to meet the growing needs
and retain customer interest in their products (Garvin
1983, p. 14). On the other hand, we expect to see a direct
effect of industry on employee spin-off performance, as
industry characteristics, such as the potential for product
differentiation, and the power of suppliers and cus-
tomers, are known to determine firms’ profit potential
(Porter 1980, p. 143). We also control for the Number of
patents at the time of a spin-off’ foundation and for prior
values of i t s R&D spending per employee
(R&Dperempt-1) as indicators of its inputs for innova-
tion, as well as for its prior sales levels (Salest-1).
Second, we control for founder-related characteris-
tics, in particular for the Number of founders at the time
of foundation and for whether or not any of the founders
held a university degree when founding the business
(binary variable Education). Additionally, we control
for Entrepreneurial experience measured by a binary
variable indicating whether or not any of the founders
had established an enterprise before founding this firm,
as well as for their number of years of working experi-
ence in the industry the spin-off is mainly operating in
(Industry experience) captured in the reference year. If
the spin-off has multiple founders, the industry experi-
ence of the founder with most years of industry experi-
ence is used.
Lastly, we include variables associated with the par-
ent organization, namely parent size and founders’ pre-
vious position at the parent firm. Parent size is measured
as its number of employees at the time of spin-off
foundation, because larger incumbent companies may
be less likely to react to new competitors when chal-
lenged by a new product introduction (Kuester et al.
1999). Second, under German Commercial Code
(“Handelsgesetzbuch,” section 74), non-compete cove-
nants between firms and their employees do not fully
apply to board members and managing directors as they
are not regarded as regular employees. Therefore, we
include a founder’s previous managerial position, i.e.,
whether or not a founder was a chief executive at the
parent organization, as a control.
Since the control variables Age, Initial employment,
Salest-1, Industry experience, Parent size, and Employee
poaching are highly skewed, we log-transform them in
order to normalize their distribution. If these variables
contain zero values, we add the smallest positive value
before log-transformation. It is important to note that the
main variables of interest (Parental hostility and spin-
offs’ strategic actions pertaining to Product substitut-
ability, Employee poaching, and Intrapreneurial at-
tempt) are captured at the time of spin-offs’ foundation
and are time invariant, while spin-offs’ innovation and
economic performance are observed at later points in
time (see Agarwal et al. 2004). We include time dummy
variables so as to control for unobserved effects associ-
ated with each year observation.
3.3 Estimation approach
We test our propositions regarding the relationship be-
tween spin-offs’ initial strategic actions, parental hostility,
and employee spin-offs’ subsequent performance using a
non-linear mediation analysis (e.g., Imai et al. 2010a,
2010b; Imai et al. 2011), which we implement using a
mediation package in the statistical R-software (Tingley
et al. 2014). Given the non-linear nature of the mediator
(Parental hostility) and outcome variables (Firm innova-
tion, Market innovation), marginal effects are no longer
constant as they depend on the value of other covariates
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(Wooldridge 2002). This means that mediation effects
cannot be simply computed by taking a product of coeffi-
cients as in a traditional (linear) mediation analysis (e.g.,
Baron and Kenny 1986). Non-linear mediation analysis,
which is based on the potential outcomes framework (e.g.,
Holland 1986), overcomes this problem, as it is not tied to
any specific functional or distributional form, and therefore
is suitable for fitting non-linear and non-parametric models
(Imai et al. 2011).
In a non-linear mediation analysis, the mediation
effect is defined as the effect of the treatment variable
(Ti = t) on the outcome variable (Yi) that is solely trans-
mitted via the mediator (Mi):
δi tð Þ ¼ Y i t;Mi 1ð Þð Þ−Y i t;Mi 0ð Þð Þ
for each unit i and the treatment status t = 0, 1. In other
words, it is calculated as the difference between (1) the
estimated value of the outcome variable under the con-
dition of having estimated the mediator with the treat-
ment variable, Mi(1), and (2) the estimated value of the
outcome variable under the condition of omitting the
treatment variable from the estimation of the mediator,
Mi(0), while holding the treatment status constant at t
(Imai et al. 2010a, p. 311). Because the treatment is
fixed and only the mediator changes, the method allows
to isolate causal mechanisms.
It should be noted however that although we observe
Yi{t,Mi(t)} for units with Ti = t, we can never observe
the counterfactual outcome Yi{t,Mi(1 − t)} in the com-
mon research design with one observation per unit. This
makes identifying causal mechanisms difficult and re-
quires an additional assumption known as Sequential
Ignorability (SI) (Imai et al. 2010a, 2010b; Imai et al.
2011).4 Whereas this SI assumption cannot be tested
directly from the observed data, sensitivity analysis
allows the researcher to evaluate how an estimated
quantity would change for different degrees of violation
of the key identification assumption (Hicks and Tingley
2011), and therefore to assess the likelihood that the
identified relationships can indeed be interpreted as
causal mechanisms.
As traditional mediation analysis is limited in terms
of drawing causal inferences, non-linear mediation anal-
ysis is receiving momentum among scholars aiming to
disentangle the causal relationships between their vari-
ables of interest (Keele et al. 2015). It is widely applied
in different fields spanning from life sciences such as
medicine (e.g., Linden and Karlson 2013) to social
sciences such as psychology (e.g., Imai et al. 2010a),
political sciences (e.g., Mattes and Weeks 2019), or
economics (e.g., Bammens and Hünermund 2019;
Emmenegger et al. 2015).
4 Results
Along with main descriptive statistics and pairwise cor-
relationmatrix (Table 1), we now provide the results from
the individual models of the mediation analysis (Table 2).
As predicted in Hypothesis 1, Product substitutability
has a significant positive effect on Parental hostility at the
1% level (model 1: β = 0.350, p < 0.01). Since this equa-
tion is estimated using Probit model, we also calculate an
average marginal effect of Product substitutability on the
probability that Parental hostility will prevail, and this
effect is positive (AME = 0.059) and significant (CI =
[0.035; 0.085]) at the 95% confidence level. In other
words, the likelihood of Parental hostility is on average 6
percentage points higher if an employee spin-off proceeds
with a substitute product strategy. Also, in line with Hy-
pothesis 2, spin-offs that poach employees from their
parent organizations are more likely to face Parental hos-
tility (model 1: β= 0.299, p< 0.01). Specifically, the re-
sults indicate that if a spin-off hires one additional employ-
ee from the parent, the likelihood of Parental hostility
increases by 1.4% (AME = 0.055; CI = [0.036; 0.074];
taken into account the logarithmic transformation). Finally,
the Intrapreneurial attempts by a spin-off’s founder to first
implement the business idea within the parent company
have a significant positive relationship with Parental hos-
tility towards the spin-off’s foundation (model 1: β =
0.299, p< 0.01). These Intrapreneurial attempts on aver-
age increase the likelihood of Parental hostility by 9%
(AME = 0.088, CI= [0.066; 0.111]), thus supporting Hy-
pothesis 3. Overall, these findings strongly support the idea
that initial strategic actions increasing the perceived com-
petitive threat a spin-off poses to its parent indeed serve as
4 The Sequential Ignorability assumption requires that two ignorability
conditions are met sequentially. First, it requires that the treatment
assignment is exogenous given the observed pretreatment confounders,
i.e., it is statistically independent of potential outcomes and potential
mediators (Imai et al. 2011). The first part of assumption is also known
as “exogeneity” or “no omitted variable bias.” Second, it requires that
the observed mediator is ignorable given the treatment status and
pretreatment confounders. That is, there are no unidentified covariates
that could confound the relationship between mediator and outcome
variable (Imai et al. 2011). We further discuss this assumption in the
results section.
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Table 2 Individual models for a mediation analysis
Mediator model Outcome model
Parental
hostility
Firm
innovation
Market
innovation
Absolute employment
growth(ln)
Absolute sales
growth(ln)
(1) Probit (2) Probit (3) Probit (4) OLS (5) OLS
Parental hostility 0.171** 0.198** 0.184*** 0.195**
(0.074) (0.086) (0.035) (0.092)
Product
substitutability
0.350*** − 0.305*** − 0.475*** 0.062** 0.151**
(0.082) (0.056) (0.065) (0.027) (0.071)
ln(Empl. poaching) 0.299*** 0.019 0.053 0.342*** 0.459***
(0.053) (0.044) (0.050) (0.021) (0.054)
Intrapreneurial
attempts
0.498*** 0.121** 0.185*** 0.007 0.108*
(0.069) (0.051) (0.061) (0.024) (0.063)
ln(Salest-1) 0.097*** 0.015 0.004 0.064*** 0.477***
(0.023) (0.010) (0.011) (0.005) (0.012)
ln(Age) − 0.538*** − 0.092 − 0.120 − 0.043 − 0.111
(0.127) (0.096) (0.113) (0.046) (0.122)
ln(Initial employment) − 0.041 0.034 0.026 0.504*** 0.245***
(0.055) (0.043) (0.050) (0.020) (0.054)
Number of patents 0.000 0.012 0.010 0.004 0.019**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008)
R&Dperempt-1 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000 − 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education 0.154** 0.108* 0.146** 0.030 − 0.025
(0.073) (0.056) (0.064) (0.027) (0.070)
Entrepreneurial exp. 0.152** 0.081 0.026 0.073*** − 0.070
(0.068) (0.053) (0.061) (0.025) (0.066)
ln(Industry exp.) − 0.084 − 0.125*** − 0.089* − 0.047** − 0.141**
(0.065) (0.047) (0.054) (0.022) (0.059)
Number of founders − 0.334*** 0.103*** 0.106*** 0.021 0.028
(0.056) (0.036) (0.039) (0.017) (0.045)
ln(Parent size) − 0.107*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.044***
(0.016) (0.010) (0.012) (0.005) (0.013)
Chief executive 0.167** 0.064 0.187*** 0.078*** 0.053
(0.075) (0.061) (0.069) (0.029) (0.076)
Constant − 1.442*** − 0.591** − 0.947*** 0.033 6.539***
(0.417) (0.272) (0.316) (0.128) (0.340)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3082 3082 3082 3082 2884
Log-likelihood − 1035.536 − 1833.843 − 1253.065
Adjusted R2 0.472 0.448
F statistic 95.940*** 81.828***
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
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key factors determining Parental hostility towards its
foundation.
However, when looking into spin-offs’ subsequent per-
formance outcomes, we cannot confirm the negative effect
of Parental hostility. Contrary to Hypothesis 4, results
indicate a significant positive effect on both spin-offs’
innovation and economic performance. In particular, em-
ployee spin-offs confronted with Parental hostility are
more likely to introduce new to Firm innovation (model
2: β = 0.171, p < 0.05) and new to Market innovation
(model 3: β = 0.198, p < 0.05). They also demonstrate
higher absolute yearly employment (model 4: β = 0.184,
p < 0.01) and sales (model 5: β= 0.195, p< 0.05) growth.
As a result of this unexpected positive effect ofParental
hostility on spin-offs’ innovation and economic perfor-
mance, we also cannot confirm our final Hypotheses 5,
6, and 7. When testing the effect size of the average
mediation—how much of the effect of spin-offs’ initial
strategic actions on spin-off performance is transmitted by
the mediating variable of Parental hostility—we find that
Parental hostility indeed partially mediates the relationship
between initial strategic actions (namely Product substitut-
ability, Employee poaching, and Intrapreneurial attempts)
and employee spin-offs’ innovation and economic perfor-
mance, but these indirect effects are positive. Even though
the average mediation effects are relatively small, they are
all significantly different from zero (Table 3). Thus, our
findings suggest that employee spin-offs (1) starting with a
substitute product strategy, (2) hiring more employees
from their parent, or (3) trying to first implement their
business idea inside the parent company are more likely
to face parental hostility, which—contrary to our
expectations—in turn makes it more likely that these
spin-offs introduce innovations and achieve higher levels
of absolute employment and sales growth.
Moreover, we observe that the positive indirect ef-
fects of Employee poaching and Intrapreneurial at-
tempts are strengthened by a positive direct effect on
spin-offs’ innovation and economic performance. This
results in a total significant and positive effect of Em-
ployee poaching and Intrapreneurial attempts on spin-
offs’ innovation and economic performance (Table 3).
Whereas we find similar relationships between Product
substitutability and economic performance, we observe
a direct negative effect of Product substitutability on
innovation performance, which outweighs its positive
indirect effect.
In addition, we find that larger parent organizations
are less likely to retaliate (as in Kuester et al. 1999), and
respectively that this parent size is positively associated
with spin-offs’ performance (as in Phillips 2002). More-
over, whether a founder held a chief executive position
at the parent company, and thus was not obliged to sign
non-compete agreements, is positively related to paren-
tal hostility as well as to its performance. Finally, we
observe significant direct industry effects on the likeli-
hood of parental hostility and spin-offs’ performance.
4.1 Additional analyses
In order to verify the robustness of our empirical find-
ings, we conducted several robustness checks. First, we
inspected to what extent a common method variance
could be an issue in a current dataset. Following
Podsakoff et al. (2003), we completed Harman’s one-
factor test using exploratory factor analysis. The respec-
tive test revealed that the issue is not present, since we
obtained 30 different factor loadings, among which 5
factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 jointly explained
up to 61% of the total variance (with the most important
single factor explaining only 16%).
Second, we performed a sensitivity analysis which
enables us to inspect for violations of the Sequential
Ignorability (SI) assumption—the main and yet untest-
able assumption needed for identification (Imai et al.
2010a, 2010b; Tingley et al. 2014)—in our mediation
model. Specifically, a sensitivity analysis allows to as-
sess the degree to which the key identifying assumption
must be violated for our conclusions to be reversed. It is
based on an estimation of a sensitivity parameter ρ—a
correlation between the error terms of the mediation and
the outcome models. If the error term correlation is
equal to zero (ρ = 0), then the SI assumption holds,
meaning that all relevant confounders have been condi-
tioned on. However, if this term is not equal to zero (ρ ≠
0), we expect the SI assumption is violated, meaning
that there exist omitted variables that are related to both
the mediator (Parental hostility) and the outcome vari-
able (i.e., spin-offs’ innovation and economic perfor-
mance). Sensitivity analyses, which we approximate
using linear probability modeling for binary outcome
variables (Tingley et al. 2014), indicate that our conclu-
sions regarding average mediation effects are robust,
and can be causally interpreted. That is, the original
results would hold unless ρ > 0.1 for both innovation
performance outcomes and sales growth or ρ > 0.2 for
employment growth at the 95% confidence level (see
Figs. 1, 2, 3 and 4 in the Appendix).
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Although the sensitivity analysis with respect to the
Sequential Ignorability provides us with robust evidence
supporting our main findings, we also investigate
endogeneity concerns using the instrumental variable ap-
proach (see discussion by Antonakis et al. 2010; Imai et al.
2011). There could be concerns about potential
endogeneity, as parental hostility may force the employee
spin-off to launch dissimilar products, refrain from hiring
its employees, or avoid implementing the idea internally in
order to avoid retaliation. However, as the relationship
between these strategic actions and parental hostility are
shown to be positive (instead of negative), we feel rather
confident in this respect. As there may however be a
concern that anticipated spin-off performance could influ-
ence a parent’s reaction (issue of reverse causality), we test
the robustness of our findings by a two-stage least squares
(2SLS) approach, where we use fitted probabilities as an
instrument for the conceivably endogenous binary variable
Parental hostility (see Wooldridge 2002, p. 621–633). As
instrumental variables that can potentially explain parental
hostility without having a direct effect on spin-off
performance once the endogenous variable is controlled
for, we propose two variables. First, parents are expected to
be especially hostile to the foundation of a spin-off when
the founder of that spin-off is of particular importance for
their performance (Campbell et al. 2012; Moncada et al.
1999; Wezel et al. 2006). In particular, we argue that a
founder who was previously working in the sales depart-
ment of the parent organization (Sales position) may be
especially valuable to the parent organization as she does
not only have in-depth knowledge on the parent’s product,
but also on the parent’s clientele and confidential market
information (Boeker 1997). Whereas parents have
established practices to protect their technology from imi-
tation by imposing intellectual property rights (e.g.,
patenting), it is much more difficult to keep employees
from creating private ties with their customers and sup-
pliers. As suggested by Phillips (2002), a parent’s compet-
itive position is threatened to a greater extent if an employ-
ee is capable to take away its main customers or suppliers.
Although the commercial experience can contribute to the
overall spin-off performance (e.g., Buenstorf 2007;
Table 3 Mediation analysis
Firm innovation Market innovation Absolute employment growth(ln) Absolute sales growth(ln)
Product substitutability
Average mediation effect 0.004** 0.003** 0.012*** 0.013***
[0.000; 0.010] [0.000; 0.010] [0.004; 0.020] [0.002; 0.030]
Average direct effect − 0.106*** − 0.115*** 0.062** 0.151**
[− 0.143; − 0.060] [− 0.145; − 0.080] [0.011; 0.120] [0.001; 0.300]
Total effect − 0.102*** − 0.113*** 0.073*** 0.164**
[− 0.139; − 0.060] [− 0.142; − 0.080] [0.021; 0.130] [0.018; 0.310]
Employee poaching
Average mediation effect 0.003*** 0.003** 0.007*** 0.009***
[0.001; 0.010] [0.000; 0.010] [0.005; 0.020] [0.002; 0.020]
Average direct effect 0.006 0.012 0.342*** 0.459***
[− 0.023; 0.04] [− 0.011; 0.030] [0.290; 0.390] [0.334; 0.580]
Total effect 0.009 0.015 0.349*** 0.468***
[− 0.019; 0.040] [− 0.000; 0.030] [0.299; 0.410] [0.338; 0.600]
Intrapreneurial attempts
Average mediation effect 0.006** 0.004** 0.015*** 0.016***
[0.001; 0.010] [0.000; 0.010] [0.009; 0.030] [0.004; 0.030]
Average direct effect 0.041** 0.041*** 0.007 0.108*
[0.005; 0.070] [0.013; 0.070] [− 0.040; 0.050] [− 0.011; 0.230]
Total effect 0.047*** 0.045*** 0.023 0.124**
[0.011; 0.080] [0.017; 0.070] [− 0.022; 0.070] [0.003; 0.250]
95% confidence intervals (nonparametric) are bootstrapped using 1000 replications and reported in squared brackets
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Chatterji 2009), we believex this experience is far less
important once other founder experiences and character-
istics are taken into account. More precisely, commercial
experience, in contrast to technical experience, has been
shown in several studies to have no direct effect on spin-off
performance once other factors influencing the knowledge
transfer from incumbent to the spin-off as well as founders’
qualities andmanagerial experiences are accounted for (see
Colombo and Grilli 2005, 2007). As Colombo and Grilli
(2005, p. 975) conclude, “it is the technical work experi-
ence of founders as opposed to their commercial work
experience that determines growth.”As such, the previous
Sales position of the founder conceptually meets the con-
ditions to be used as an instrumental variable. Second, we
use parental hostility averaged across industries (Industry
average of hostility) as an instrument explaining part of
unobserved features in our model. This method is widely
used in econometric settings (e.g., Hottenrott et al. 2017;
Jordaan 2011). In order to assure a considerable amount of
instrument variation, this industry average of parental hos-
tility is calculated according to the year of spin-off
establishment. The results of a Two-Step IV approach are
consistent with our key findings (see Table 4 in the
Appendix).
Moreover, since our study focuses on newly established
firms, we also inspected whether our main findings are
affected by the survivorship bias. Similar to Cassar (2004),
we conducted robustness tests by exploiting cross-
sectional data with respect to the survey wave of 2010
(see Table 5 in the Appendix), and by restricting the
sample to spin-offs that are up to 3 years old (i.e.,
sampling firms closer to their formation period; see
Table 6 in the Appendix). We also compared mean differ-
ences between the spin-offs in our sample that survived
until the year 2015 and those that did not (information
retrieved from the Creditreform database) (see Table 7 in
the Appendix). No significant differences were found. We
also added a dummy variable representing this information
on survival to our empirical analysis (see Table 8 in the
Appendix). All these additional analyses confirm our main
results, indicating that survivorship bias is not substantially
affecting our findings.
b ACME of Employee poachinga ACME of products substitutability c ACME of intrapreneurial attempts
Fig. 1 a ACME of product substitutability; b ACME of employee poaching; c ACME of intrapreneurial attempts
b ACME of Employee poachinga ACME of products substitutability c ACME of intrapreneurial attempts
Fig. 2 a ACME of product substitutability; b ACME of employee poaching; c ACME of intrapreneurial attempts
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We also inspected for industry differences on a more
aggregated level by dividing spin-offs into manufacturing
and service sectors (i.e., we constructed a binary variable
equal to 1 if the spin-off is active in a manufacturing
industry, and zero if it is in a service sector). We find that
this variable has a positive significant effect on parental
hostility as well as on spin-offs’ innovation and economic
performance. Nevertheless, we observe no substantial
moderating effect of manufacturing versus services on
the relationship between a spin-off’s initial strategic actions
and Parental hostility, nor on the relationship between
Parental hostility and spin-off performance, indicating that
the relationships we hypothesized hold both for spin-offs
in manufacturing and in service sectors.
Finally, we also conducted additional robustness
checks, such as incorporating product substitutability as a
moderator of the parental hostility employee spin-off per-
formance relationship (which turned out to be insignifi-
cant), using a different specification of product
substitutability (i.e., not only similar but also improved
goods or services), controlling for a broader set of vari-
ables, implementing different types of models, and using
only one observation per venture (instead of pooled data).
All these different specifications led to similar results,
pointing to the robustness of our main findings. The results
are available from the authors upon request.
5 Discussion and implications
This study clarifies the relationship between employee
spin-offs’ initial strategic actions, their parents’ hostile
reaction towards spin-off foundation, and the spin-offs’
subsequent performance. Our findings show that spin-
offs’ initial strategic actions with respect to (1) product
substitutability, (2) employee poaching, and (3) intra-
preneurial attempts to first implement the business idea
inside the parent organization are strong factors
b ACME of Employee poachinga ACME of products substitutability c ACME of intrapreneurial attempts
Fig. 3 a ACME of product substitutability; b ACME of Employee poaching; c ACME of intrapreneurial attempts
b ACME of Employee poachinga ACME of products substitutability c ACME of intrapreneurial attempts
Fig. 4 aACME of product substitutability; bACME of employee
poaching; c ACME of intrapreneurial attempts. The figures1–4
present the sensitivity analyses. The estimated ACME is plotted
against the sensitivity parameter ρ. The shaded areas depict 95%
confidence intervals, which are bootstrapped using 1000 replica-
tions, and represent ACME at each value of ρ. present point
estimates under sequential ignorability assumption
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conditioning parental hostility, which in turn positively
affects employee spin-offs’ innovation and economic
performance. These findings contribute to the literature
on employee spin-offs in several ways.
First, our work highlights the crucial role of employee
spin-offs’ initial strategic actions for the relationship with
their parent. We propose that by commercializing similar
goods or services, hiring employees from the parent orga-
nization, or trying to first implement the business idea
inside the parent organization, spin-offs pose a greater
(perceived) competitive threat to their parent
organizations, and thus are more likely to be challenged
by them. We also extend the seminal work byWalter et al.
(2014) investigating the effect of parental hostility on spin-
offs’ performance. While Walter et al. (2014) advanced
product substitutability as a potential factor aggravating the
negative effect of parental hostility on performance (but
could not empirically observe this effect), our study ad-
vances product substitutability (among other initial strate-
gic actions) as a mechanism that leads to these hostile
reactions in the first place. As such, we find that the links
between parental hostility, spin-offs’ strategies, and spin-
offs’ performance are more complex than previously as-
sumed, with spin-offs’ initial strategic actions acting as key
drivers of parental hostility towards spin-off foundation.
Second, our study advances current knowledge regard-
ing the phenomenon of parental hostility and its effect on
spin-off performance. While hostility was expected to re-
strict spin-offs’ access to resources (both inside and outside
the parent firm) and thereby negatively affect their perfor-
mance (see also empirical evidence by Walter et al. 2014),
we observe a positive effect. Upon reflection, we believe
that this effect can be explained partly by several reasons.
First, hostility frees the spin-off from its parent’s routines—
allowing it to act autonomously and flexibly—and even
forces it to develop novel resources and competences that
in turn contribute to its performance. This reasoning is also
in line with McGrath (2001) and Cirillo et al. (2014), who
found a positive effect of autonomy on the performance of
incumbents’ internal innovation projects. This interpretation
suggests that future work should consider flexibility and the
development of novel resources and competences as a
mediator between parental hostility and employee spin-off
performance. At the same time, similar to competition and
retaliation scholars, our findings suggest that by departing
from their parental heritage and thus creating novel compe-
tencies, employee spin-offs can not only reduce the effec-
tiveness of their parents’ retaliatory actions (Chen 1996) and
thus increase their chances of survival (Fan 2010), but even
improve their performance in these competitive circum-
stances (Andrevski and Ferrier 2019). Finally, by hindering
spin-offs’ establishment parent companies may actually
endorse them and spark investors’ and consumers’ interest.
As Agarwal and Shah (2014, p. 114) discussed, “[t]his
competition does not necessarily bode badly for employee
founded firms, who often exert competitive pressures on
their parents and generally outperform other firms that enter
in the industry.”
Also, our study sheds light on the overall effect of
employee spin-offs’ initial strategy on their performance.
We find that in addition to having a positive effect via
parental hostility, a spin-off’s initial strategic actions (i.e.,
product substitutability, employee poaching, and intrapre-
neurial attempts) in general also have a positive direct effect
on its performance. The only exception relates to the com-
mercialization of similar products which has a direct nega-
tive effect on the spin-off’s innovation performance. More-
over, the parent’s hostile reaction towards this product sub-
stitutability and the resulting development of novel compe-
tences and resources does not compensate for this large
direct negative effect. Overall, employee spin-offs that ini-
tially launch products similar to their parents’ offering, will
be less successful in developing new to firm or new to
market innovations afterwards. This suggests that although
spin-offs benefit from prior technical and market related
knowledge (e.g., Franco and Filson 2006; Klepper and
Sleeper 2005), over-reliance on products and services sim-
ilar to those of the parent firmmay insulate the spin-off from
other sources of learning (Parhankangas and Arenius 2003),
and thus negatively affect its innovation performance.
In terms of practical implications, our results suggest
that employee spin-offs entering themarketwith a business
strategy that appears to pose a threat to the competitive
position of their parent organization, should expect some
hostility from that parent. However, this should not dis-
courage them from starting up. Instead, they should take
advantage of this ruptured relationship to develop their
own routines, decision-making structures, network, com-
petences, and strategy to cope with the entrepreneurial
challenges they are facing. Instead of relying too much
on the knowledge and routines inherited from their parents,
they should pursue autonomous decision-making and
competence building. What is more, whereas previous
work has focused on how spin-offs can react to hostile
reactions from the parent, our study illustrates that spin-
offs can take a proactive stance in this respect. Given their
initial strategy, they can try to predict what the reaction of
the parent will be, allowing them to prepare several action
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plans, which in the end may positively affect spin-off
performance (Clark and Montgomery 1996). As for cor-
porate parents, our results suggest that hostility towards
employee spin-offs will probably not pay off, as it does not
reduce spin-offs’ innovation and economic performance,
but in fact makes them perform better. Instead, our study
suggest that corporate parents could benefit by providing
employee spin-offs with autonomy in decision-making
while maintaining at the same time friendly relationships.
Parents may benefit from the knowledge spill-in from their
former employees’ newventures, but only on the condition
that these employee spin-offs consider them trustworthy
(Kim and Steensma 2017).
Although we are convinced that the current study
makes several contributions, it also has some limitations
opening avenues for future research. Firstly, the fact that
our findings on the performance effect of parental hos-
tility contradict those ofWalter et al. (2014) points to the
need to improve our understanding further. One possible
explanation for this contradicting finding may be related
to differences in the sample. The study by Walter et al.
(2014) analyzes only spin-offs that are built on a tech-
nology transfer from their parent firms, and thus looks
only into technology-based spin-offs. In this regard, the
access to parents’ resources may bemore important than
autonomy or competence building, and spin-offs
confronted with parental hostility may therefore need
more time to become breakeven. Our study imposes less
stringent criteria and defines employee spin-offs based
on the importance of a business idea developed by the
founder while still working at the parent company. As
such, it analyzes both technology-based and non-
technology-based new ventures. The fact that our find-
ings contradict those ofWalter et al. (2014) suggests that
more research is needed to understand the precise con-
ditions under which parental hostility can have positive
or negative effects on spin-off performance. In addition
to the industry life-cycle (advanced by Robinson and
McDougall 2001), the technology-intensity of a spin-off
should thus be explored as a potential contingency
factor in further studies.
Other potential explanations for our contradictory
finding are that (1) the effect of parental hostility on
spin-off performance may be curvilinear or that (2)
different types of parental hostility, which can be either
proactive (e.g., non-compete clauses) or reactive (e.g.,
patent litigation, propagation of negative information)
may have different performance implications. Unfortu-
nately, the current dataset does not allow us to measure
the degree of parental hostility, nor to distinguish differ-
ent types of it. Even though our robustness tests did not
indicate any differences of the effect of parental hostility
between spin-offs that survived and those that did not
survive in the longer term, we cannot fully rule out a
possibility that unpromising spin-offs confronted with
fiercer parental hostility may not have started-up in the
first place, resulting in market entry only by the most
resilient ones (c.f. Klepper and Sleeper 2005). Also, we
are not able to statistically rule out that parents will only
react against spin-offs that truly pose a competitive
threat. However, as anecdotal evidence shows that cor-
porate venturing programs commonly fail to identify
successful ventures (even among spin-offs), it seems
that parent organizations, just like independent venture
capitalists, have difficulties assessing the true potential
of spin-offs upfront. Therefore, we believe that parental
hostility will follow from the perceived competitive
threat a venture poses. We hope that these concerns will
inspire future scholarly work.
In addition, existing literature on competition and
retaliation suggests that new entrants—and hence also
spin-offs—can counter parental hostility by choosing
the proper entrepreneurial strategy (e.g., Covin et al.
2000; Fan 2010). Future research could therefore move
beyond our focus on spin-offs’ initial strategy at
founding, and also study changes in the employee
spin-off’s entrepreneurial strategy as a reaction to pa-
rental hostility. Moreover, while we study how parental
hostility at the time of foundation affects employee spin-
offs’ later performance, it would be interesting to ob-
serve how the parent’s reaction and its effect on spin-off
performance change over time. For example, hostile
parents may become more collaborative over time, or
vice versa. With respect to the former evolution, the
study by McKendrick et al. (2009) shows that the ini-
tially detrimental effect of an employee spin-off’s estab-
lishment on its parent’s activities is reduced and may
even become positive in the long term, implying that a
parent may switch from being hostile to being support-
ive. With respect to the latter evolution, some parents
may not engage in retaliatory actions from the beginning
of the spin-off, as for example the costs of spin-offs’
preemption may exceed the expected benefits, and these
parents may be better off “gambling” that spin-off ac-
tivities would not disturb their market share (Klepper
2009, p. 647). However, they may decide to engage in
retaliation activities once the spin-off turns out to be a
real competitive threat. Finally, although we attempted
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Table 4 Estimation results from the two-step IV approach
First stage (Probit) Second stage (OLS)
Parental
hostility
Parental
hostility
Firm
innovation
Market
innovation
Absolute
employment
growth(ln)
Absolute sales
growth(ln)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parental hostility 0.316** 0.467*** 0.634** 0.170
(0.161) (0.180) (0.294) (0.575)
Product substitutability 0.350** 0.355** − 0.117*** − 0.133*** 0.037 0.135
(0.156) (0.159) (0.026) (0.024) (0.048) (0.090)
ln(Empl. poaching) 0.299*** 0.305*** − 0.010 − 0.014 0.312*** 0.454***
(0.100) (0.102) (0.020) (0.020) (0.045) (0.075)
Intrapreneurial attempts 0.498*** 0.475*** 0.018 0.003 − 0.035 0.103
(0.128) (0.128) (0.026) (0.024) (0.047) (0.084)
ln(Salest-1) 0.097*** 0.083*** 0.002 − 0.004 0.060*** 0.482***
(0.033) (0.031) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.046)
ln(Age) − 0.538** − 0.149 − 0.008 0.007 − 0.002 − 0.153
(0.211) (0.239) (0.044) (0.038) (0.071) (0.168)
ln(Initial employment) − 0.041 − 0.022 0.011 0.006 0.503*** 0.240***
(0.107) (0.110) (0.018) (0.017) (0.045) (0.067)
Number of patents − 0.000 0.002 0.004* 0.004 0.004** 0.019***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006)
R&Dperempt-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 − 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education 0.154 0.137 0.033 0.027 0.021 − 0.025
(0.133) (0.135) (0.026) (0.023) (0.047) (0.085)
Entrepreneurial exp. 0.152 0.164 0.019 − 0.012 0.058 − 0.074
(0.127) (0.127) (0.024) (0.022) (0.045) (0.071)
ln(Industry exp.) − 0.084 − 0.080 − 0.040* − 0.013 − 0.040 − 0.133*
(0.109) (0.111) (0.021) (0.019) (0.035) (0.080)
Number of founders − 0.334*** − 0.321*** 0.052*** 0.054*** 0.046 0.027
(0.097) (0.100) (0.018) (0.018) (0.038) (0.082)
ln(Parent size) − 0.107*** − 0.108*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.043*** 0.043**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.018)
Chief executive 0.167 0.123 0.012 0.031 0.058 0.050
(0.143) (0.145) (0.027) (0.026) (0.050) (0.102)
Industry average of hostility 8.212***
(2.501)
Sales position 0.201
(0.128)
Constant − 1.442** − 2.468*** 0.252** 0.133 − 0.055 6.553***
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Table 4 (continued)
First stage (Probit) Second stage (OLS)
Parental
hostility
Parental
hostility
Firm
innovation
Market
innovation
Absolute
employment
growth(ln)
Absolute sales
growth(ln)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(0.645) (0.730) (0.111) (0.096) (0.198) (0.585)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3082 3078 3078 3078 3078 2881
Log-likelihood − 1035.536 − 1013.851
Model χ2 118*** 126*** 297*** 191*** 1099*** 1102***
1Endogeneity 2.81* 8.30*** 2.64 0.00
Standard errors clustered at the firm level are in the parentheses. Significance levels: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
The 1st stage Probit regression (model 2) shows the effects of all the exogenous variables and excluded instruments on the endogenous
variable Parental hostility. The fitted probability of Parental hostility (from a model 2) is used as an instrument in the 2nd stage regressions
(models 3–6)
1 Test of endogeneity using robust standard errors adjusted by clusters using F-stat.; H0 indicates model’s exogeneity (Wooldridge, 1995)
Table 5 Individual models for a mediation analysis on cross-sectional data (survey wave of 2010)
Parental
hostility
Firm
innovation
Market
innovation
Absolute employment
growth(ln)
Absolute sales
growth(ln)
(1) Probit (2) Probit (3) Probit (4) OLS (5) OLS
Parental hostility 0.264* 0.198 0.168*** 0.305
(0.138) (0.158) (0.062) (0.205)
Product substitutability 0.421*** − 0.182* − 0.310*** 0.017 0.228
(0.159) (0.103) (0.118) (0.046) (0.157)
ln(Empl. poaching) 0.380*** − 0.07 0.124 0.320*** 0.463***
(0.099) (0.081) (0.091) (0.036) (0.119)
Intrapreneurial attempts 0.551*** 0.081 0.072 0.005 0.165
(0.134) (0.093) (0.110) (0.041) (0.139)
ln(Salest-1) 0.067** 0.015 − 0.007 0.033*** 0.437***
(0.032) (0.015) (0.016) (0.006) (0.022)
ln(Age) − 0.406** − 0.218 − 0.377** 0.021 − 0.29
(0.194) (0.142) (0.167) (0.063) (0.214)
ln(Initial employment) − 0.072 0.078 0.041 0.552*** 0.249**
(0.103) (0.078) (0.090) (0.035) (0.117)
Number of patents 0.007 0.188 0.007 0.003 0.030**
(0.012) (0.181) (0.01) (0.004) (0.014)
R&Dperempt-1 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000 − 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education 0.247* 0.102 0.220* 0.087* 0.141
(0.143) (0.105) (0.118) (0.047) (0.156)
Entrepreneurial exp. 0.117 0.045 0.015 0.059 − 0.278*
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Table 5 (continued)
Parental
hostility
Firm
innovation
Market
innovation
Absolute employment
growth(ln)
Absolute sales
growth(ln)
(1) Probit (2) Probit (3) Probit (4) OLS (5) OLS
(0.131) (0.097) (0.112) (0.043) (0.145)
ln(Industry exp.) − 0.028 0.002 − 0.009 − 0.057 − 0.205*
(0.116) (0.079) (0.091) (0.035) (0.120)
Number of founders − 0.296*** 0.116 0.08 − 0.022 − 0.001
(0.109) (0.072) (0.077) (0.032) (0.105)
ln(Parent size) − 0.099*** 0.016 0.03 0.033*** 0.038
(0.031) (0.019) (0.021) (0.008) (0.028)
Chief executive 0.075 0.095 0.143 0.107** 0.005
(0.144) (0.110) (0.124) (0.049) (0.166)
Constant − 1.949*** − 0.305 − 0.589 0.274* 7.734***
(0.521) (0.320) (0.360) (0.143) (0.486)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 898 898 898 898 818
Log-likelihood − 284.8 − 567.069 − 390.442
Adjusted R2 0.478 0.42
F statistic 35.273*** 25.612***
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
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Table 6 Individual models for a mediation analysis on a subset of spin-offs up to 3 years old
Parental hostility Firm innovation Market innovation Absolute employment
growth(ln)
Absolute sales
growth(ln)
(1) Probit (2) Probit (3) Probit (4) OLS (5) OLS
Parental hostility 0.240* 0.185 0.220*** 0.409**
(0.128) (0.150) (0.053) (0.197)
Product substitutability 0.331** − 0.132 − 0.368*** 0.092** 0.224
(0.142) (0.098) (0.114) (0.041) (0.152)
ln(Empl. poaching) 0.422*** − 0.011 0.086 0.353*** 0.647***
(0.089) (0.075) (0.087) (0.031) (0.114)
Intrapreneurial attempts 0.398*** 0.035 0.143 − 0.028 0.126
(0.122) (0.089) (0.108) (0.037) (0.138)
ln(Salest-1) 0.070*** 0.015 − 0.002 0.032*** 0.388***
(0.025) (0.013) (0.014) (0.005) (0.020)
ln(Age) − 0.577* − 0.350 − 0.730*** 0.005 − 0.201
(0.306) (0.225) (0.263) (0.093) (0.353)
ln(Initial employment) − 0.023 0.038 0.016 0.509*** 0.324***
(0.096) (0.076) (0.090) (0.031) (0.117)
Number of patents − 0.787* 0.068 0.120 0.003 0.019
(0.419) (0.150) (0.184) (0.003) (0.012)
R&Dperempt-1 0.000 0.000* 0.000** 0.000 − 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education − 0.012 0.088 0.243** 0.086** 0.247
(0.135) (0.098) (0.111) (0.041) (0.154)
Entrepreneurial exp. 0.194 − 0.079 − 0.198* 0.021 − 0.148
(0.119) (0.092) (0.109) (0.038) (0.142)
ln(Industry exp.) 0.050 − 0.188*** − 0.210** − 0.002 − 0.167
(0.106) (0.072) (0.083) (0.030) (0.115)
Number of founders − 0.346*** 0.172*** 0.184*** 0.080*** − 0.017
(0.098) (0.063) (0.069) (0.026) (0.100)
ln(Parent size) − 0.097*** 0.017 0.013 0.039*** 0.049*
(0.029) (0.018) (0.021) (0.007) (0.028)
Chief executive 0.144 0.047 0.270** 0.069 − 0.021
(0.132) (0.107) (0.121) (0.044) (0.165)
Constant − 1.686*** − 0.021 − 0.206 0.105 7.732***
(0.545) (0.365) (0.431) (0.152) (0.579)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1009 1009 1009 1009 927
Log-likelihood − 335.596 − 625.476 − 417.681
Adjusted R2 0.549 0.421
F 48.166*** 26.848***
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
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Table 7 Survivorship bias: mean differences with respect to a binary variable Exists2015 from Creditreform database (N = 1021 employee
spin-offs)
Exists2015 = 0 Exists2015= 1
N Mean control N Mean treatment Difference Std Err t stat P value
Parental hostility 328 0.125 693 0.130 − 0.005 0.022 − 0.217 0.828
Product similarity 328 0.652 693 0.698 − 0.046 0.031 − 1.475 0.140
ln(Empl. poaching) 328 0.263 693 0.453 − 0.189 0.040 − 4.679 0.000
Intrapreneurial attempts 328 0.530 693 0.547 − 0.016 0.033 − 0.491 0.624
Table 8 Survivorship bias: including a binary variable Exists2015 from Creditreform database (i.e., whether the spin-off still exists at the
first half of 2015; the variable is equal to 1 if the spin-off still exists, and 0 otherwise)
Parental
hostility
Firm
innovation
Market
innovation
Absolute employment
growth(ln)
Absolute sales
growth(ln)
(1) Probit (2) Probit (3) Probit (4) OLS (5) OLS
Parental hostility 0.131* 0.209** 0.198*** 0.190**
(0.077) (0.089) (0.036) (0.093)
Product
substitutability
0.298*** − 0.338*** − 0.483*** 0.080*** 0.158**
(0.085) (0.058) (0.066) (0.028) (0.072)
ln(Empl. poaching) 0.234*** 0.005 0.035 0.338*** 0.424***
(0.055) (0.046) (0.053) (0.021) (0.055)
Intrapreneurial
attempts
0.595*** 0.128** 0.186*** − 0.009 0.107*
(0.073) (0.053) (0.064) (0.025) (0.064)
Exists2015 − 0.091 0.015 0.046 0.058** 0.355***
(0.075) (0.057) (0.068) (0.027) (0.070)
ln(Salest-1) 0.116*** 0.018* 0.006 0.063*** 0.486***
(0.025) (0.010) (0.011) (0.005) (0.013)
ln(Age) − 0.512*** − 0.109 − 0.164 − 0.074 − 0.131
(0.130) (0.098) (0.116) (0.046) (0.122)
ln(Initial employment) − 0.041 0.028 0.019 0.508*** 0.247***
(0.056) (0.044) (0.051) (0.021) (0.054)
Number of patents − 0.001 0.013 0.010 0.004 0.021***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.003) (0.008)
R&Dperempt-1 0.000 0.000* 0.000** 0.000 − 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(Parent size) − 0.127*** 0.030*** 0.031** 0.034*** 0.036***
(0.018) (0.011) (0.012) (0.005) (0.013)
Chief executive 0.119 0.091 0.212*** 0.091*** 0.066
(0.079) (0.063) (0.071) (0.029) (0.077)
Number of founders − 0.328*** 0.106*** 0.095** 0.022 0.019
(0.060) (0.037) (0.041) (0.018) (0.046)
Education 0.102 0.112* 0.177*** 0.028 − 0.067
(0.078) (0.058) (0.066) (0.027) (0.071)
Entrepreneurial exp. 0.185*** 0.075 − 0.001 0.093*** − 0.032
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to eliminate concerns of potential endogeneity and sur-
vivorship bias and were able to reproduce our main
findings in various robustness checks, we encourage
future studies to collect more information that could be
helpful in identifying other potential instrumental vari-
ables (e.g., actual reason of leaving parent company,
founders’ time spent at the parent company) and differ-
ent types of parental hostility as well as consider alter-
native approaches including panel data techniques to
develop our insights further.
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